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JAMES M. DARBY; ALBERT MEZZAROBA; ROBERT H. 
SHOOP, JR.,  
in their official capacities as chairman and members of the 
Pennsylvania  
Labor Relations Board; LESLEY CHILDER-POTTS, in her 
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official capacity  
as district attorney of Bedford County, and as representative 
of the class  
of all district attorneys in Pennsylvania with the authority to 
prosecute violations  
of 71 Pa. Stat. 575 
 
 
JANINE WENZIG and CATHERINE KIOUSSIS, 
 
Appellants in case no. 19-3906 
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LOCAL 668 
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for the Western District of Pennsylvania and the Middle 
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District Judges: Honorable Kim Gibson and Honorable 
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O P I N I O N 
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
In reliance on a Pennsylvania statute and the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 
(1977), Appellee Unions, the Service Employees International 
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Union Local 668 and the Pennsylvania State Education 
Association, collected “fair-share fees” from Appellants over 
Appellants’ objections.  But the Supreme Court overruled 
Abood in Janus v. AFSCME Council 31, holding that state 
legislation condoning public-sector fair-share fees was 
unconstitutional.  138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (“Janus I”).  Now, 
Appellants bring these § 1983 lawsuits seeking reimbursement 
of the sums they were required to pay.  The District Courts, 
joining a consensus of federal courts across the country, 
dismissed Appellants’ claims for monetary relief, ruling that 
because the Unions collected the fair-share fees in good faith 
reliance on a governing state statute and Supreme Court 
precedent, they are entitled to, and have successfully made out, 
a good faith defense to monetary liability under § 1983.  We 
will affirm. 
I 
A. Legal background 
Labor laws in the United States have long authorized 
employers and labor organizations to bargain for an “agency 
shop,” an arrangement in which one union is allowed to 
exclusively represent an entity’s employees on the condition 
that the union represent all the entity’s employees—even those 
who do not join the union.  See, e.g., Janus I, 138 S. Ct. at 2460; 
45 U.S.C. § 152 (Railway Labor Act); 29 U.S.C. § 159 
(National Labor Relations Act).  Agency shop arrangements 
are intended to promote uniform bargaining, streamlined 
administration, and other interests, but they also create an 
incentive for employees to decline to join their union (and 
therefore avoid paying dues) while still accruing the benefits 
of union representation.  See, e.g., Janus I, 138 S. Ct. at 2465-
69 (describing the intended purpose of agency shops to create 
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“labor peace” and describing the hypothetical potential for 
“free rider” problems in agency shop arrangements).  To 
address this incentive, Congress often allowed unions and 
employers who opt for an agency shop arrangement to require 
all employees either to join the union and pay dues or, if an 
employee does not join the union, to nonetheless contribute to 
the costs of representation, bargaining, and administration of 
bargaining agreements.  This requirement that non-members 
pay some form of union dues is often referred to as a “fair-
share” fee, and is present in various pieces of federal 
legislation, including, for instance, the Railway Labor Act, 45 
U.S.C. § 152, and the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 157, 158(a)(3). 
The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of 
these agency shop arrangements, including fair-share fees.  For 
instance, in Railway Employees’ Dep’t v. Hanson, the Supreme 
Court ruled that the Railway Labor Act’s provisions allowing 
agency shop arrangements and fair-share fees did not violate 
the First Amendment.  351 U.S. 225, 236-38 (1956).  Although 
the employees in that case argued that the agency shop 
“agreement forces men into ide[o]logical and political 
associations which violate their right to freedom of conscience, 
freedom of association, and freedom of thought protected by 
the Bill of Rights,” id. at 236, the Court “h[e]ld that the 
requirement for financial support of the collective-bargaining 
agency by all who receive the benefits of its work . . . does not 
violate” the First Amendment, id. at 238.  The Supreme Court 
later reaffirmed this ruling.  See Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. 
Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749 (1961) (affirming the 
constitutionality of the Railway Labor Act’s agency shop and 
fair-share provisions). 
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Eventually, state legislatures across the country passed 
laws authorizing public-sector unions to collect fair-share fees 
and bargain for agency shop arrangements with state 
government employers.  In Abood, the Supreme Court affirmed 
the constitutionality of one such law, a Michigan statute 
permitting state employers to negotiate for agency shop 
arrangements and fair-share fees with the public-sector unions 
that represented their employees.  431 U.S. at 224-26.  The 
Abood Court ruled that the important government interests in 
creating functional and peaceful labor relations and preventing 
the free rider problem “support the impingement upon 
associational freedom created by the agency shop.”  Id. at 225.  
Although the Court recognized that the “government may not 
require an individual to relinquish rights guaranteed [] by the 
First Amendment as a condition of public employment,” id. 
at 234, the Court held that there was no reason to distinguish 
Abood from cases like Hanson that had upheld agency shop 
arrangements in the private sector, id. at 232 (holding that the 
“differences between public- and private-sector collective 
bargaining simply do not translate into differences in First 
Amendment rights”). 
But the Abood Court also ruled that—as in the private 
sector—non-members’ fair-share fees could only be used to 
pay for union activities that were “germane to [the union’s] 
duties as collective-bargaining representative,” but not the 
union’s political or other work.  Id. at 235.  In the Abood 
Court’s view, this limitation struck an appropriate balance 
between the non-members’ speech rights under the First 
Amendment and the government’s interests in regulating labor 
relations.  Id. at 237 (describing the Court’s ruling as 
“preventing compulsory subsidization of ideological activity 
by employees who object . . . without restricting the [u]nion’s 
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ability to require every employee to contribute to the cost of 
collective-bargaining activities”).  Over the course of the 
following four decades, the Supreme Court affirmed its 
holding in Abood against similar challenges to the 
constitutionality of state laws allowing for agency shop 
arrangements between public-sector employers and public-
sector unions.  See, e.g., Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 
U.S. 507 (1991); Locke v. Karass, 555 U.S. 207 (2009); 
Friedrichs v. Cal.  Tchrs. Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (per 
curiam) (equally divided Court affirming without opinion). 
In light of Abood, Pennsylvania enacted a law allowing 
public-sector agency shop arrangements and authorizing 
unions that serve as exclusive representatives to collect fair-
share fees.  See 71 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 575 (West 
2020).  Under section 575(b), “[i]f the provisions of a 
collective bargaining agreement so provide, each nonmember 
of a collective bargaining unit shall be required to pay to the 
exclusive representative a [fair-share] fee.”  Fair-share fees 
could consist of normal dues minus “the cost for the previous 
fiscal year of [the union’s] activities or undertakings which 
were not reasonably employed to implement or effectuate the 
duties of the employe[e] organization as exclusive 
representative.”  Id. § 575(a).  The law also set forth the 
procedure by which fair-share fees would be deducted from 
non-member employees’ paychecks, see id. § 575(c), and a 
procedure through which non-member employees could obtain 
information about how their fees were used, see § 575(d).  If 
this information reflected any improper uses, non-members 
could challenge the fair-share fees.  See id. § 575(e). 
In 2018, the Supreme Court “overruled” Abood.  Janus 
I, 138 S. Ct. at 2460.  Holding that Abood “was poorly 
reasoned” and led to “practical problems and abuse,” the Court 
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ruled that Abood was “inconsistent with other First 
Amendment cases” and was not entitled to continued 
precedential status.  Id.  The Janus I Court held that Abood had 
mischaracterized the government’s interests in promoting 
“labor peace” and preventing “free-riders.”  Id. at 2465-70.  
Whereas the Abood Court had decided that those interests 
justified the fair-share fee laws’ impingement on the union 
non-members’ speech rights, the Court in Janus I stated that, 
instead, “‘labor peace’ can readily be achieved through means 
significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms,” and 
that “avoiding free riders is not a compelling interest.”  Id. at 
2466 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
Accordingly, “the First Amendment does not permit the 
government to compel a person to pay for another party’s 
speech just because the government thinks that the speech 
furthers the interests of the person who does not want to pay.”  
Id. at 2467.  State legislation allowing public-sector employers 
and public-sector unions to collect fair-share fees 
unconstitutionally forced non-members “to subsidize a union, 
even if they choose not to join and strongly object to positions 
the union takes in collective bargaining and related activities,” 
and thereby compelled non-members “to subsidize private 
speech on matters of substantial public concern.”  Id. at 2459-
60.  On this basis, the Court ruled that “[s]tates and public-
sector unions may no longer extract agency fees from 
nonconsenting employees.”  Id. at 2486.  Therefore, under 
Janus I, Pennsylvania’s public sector agency shop law was no 
longer constitutional.1 
 
1 We assume without deciding that the right announced by the 
Supreme Court in Janus I is retroactive.  Janus v. AFSCME, 
Council 31, 942 F.3d 352, 360 (7th Cir. 2019) (“Janus II”) 
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B.  Factual background 
1. Diamond facts 
Plaintiff Arthur Diamond and his six co-plaintiffs (the 
“Diamond Plaintiffs”) are current or former teachers in 
Pennsylvania public schools.  They were not members of the 
Pennsylvania State Education Association (“PSEA”), the 
union that exclusively represented their bargaining unit.  But 
PSEA’s collective bargaining agreement contained a fair-share 
clause that required they pay fair-share fees to either the union 
or to a union-approved nonreligious charity.  See Diamond 
Appellants’ Br. at 5 (citing D.A. 73-74).  Only Diamond paid 
his fair-share fee to PSEA.  Id. at 6.  The other six Plaintiffs 
directed their fees to be diverted to nonreligious charities, 
though Sandra H. Ziegler did not identify a charity.  Id. at 5-6.  
The fair-share fees were no longer collected after June 27, 
 
(“Rather than wrestle the retroactivity question to the ground, 
we think it prudent to assume for the sake of argument that the 
right recognized” by the Supreme Court in Janus I is 
retroactive.); Danielson v. Inslee, 945 F.3d 1096, 1099 (9th 
Cir. 2019) (“[W]e will assume that the right delineated in 
[Janus I] applies retroactively and proceed to a review of 
available remedies.”); Lee v. Oh. Educ. Ass’n, 951 F.3d 386, 
389 (6th Cir. 2020) (“[T]he most prudent course of action is to 
assume without deciding that the right recognized in [Janus I] 
has retroactive application.”).  Even if Janus I is retroactive, 
the good faith defense may constitute a “previously existing, 
independent legal basis” for denying the Appellants’ claims.  
See Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 759 
(1995). 
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2018, the date that the Supreme Court issued its decision in 
Janus I.  A. 74, 93-96. 
The Diamond Plaintiffs originally sued PSEA on the 
same theory as the plaintiffs in Janus I, but once the Supreme 
Court ruled in that case, the Diamond Plaintiffs amended their 
Complaint to seek repayment of the fair-share fees they had 
previously paid to their union.  See Diamond Appellants’ Br. 
at 6.  PSEA moved to dismiss the amended complaint, arguing 
that because it had collected the fees in good faith reliance on 
a Pennsylvania statute and pre-Janus I Supreme Court 
precedent authorizing fair-share fees, they could not be held 
liable for monetary damages.  Id. at 7.  The District Court 
granted the motion to dismiss, ruling that because PSEA had 
relied on a prevailing state statute and federal caselaw, they 
were entitled to a good faith defense to § 1983 liability that 
barred the Diamond Plaintiffs’ claims.  D.A. 50-51.  The 
Diamond Plaintiffs timely appealed.  D.A. 1. 
2. Wenzig facts 
Janine Wenzig and Catherine Kioussis (the “Wenzig 
Plaintiffs”) work for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.  
W.A. 8.  Like the Diamond Plaintiffs, they were forced to pay 
fair-share fees to their union, the Service Employees 
International Union Local 668, without their consent.  Id.  
Their bargaining unit’s CBA contained the following 
provision: 
The Employer further agrees to deduct a [fair-
share] fee from all compensation paid to all 
employees in the bargaining unit who are not 
members of the Union.  Authorization from non-
members to deduct [fair-share] fees shall not be 
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required.  The amounts to be deducted shall be 
certified to the Employer by the Union and the 
aggregate deductions of all employees shall be 
remitted together with an itemized statement to 
the Union by the last day of the succeeding 
month after such deductions are made.  
Wenzig App. 42. 
More than a year after Janus I was issued, the Wenzig 
Plaintiffs filed suit on behalf of themselves and a putative class 
of similarly situated employees to recover damages under 
§ 1983 for the fair-share fees that they had paid to their union.  
See Wenzig Appellants’ Br. at 3.  They sought a declaratory 
judgment that the union’s pre-Janus I collection of fair-share 
fees violated the First Amendment and repayment of all fair-
share fees that were collected.  W.S.A. 9. 
The SEIU filed a motion to dismiss their claims, which 
the District Court granted.  The District Court ruled the good 
faith defense shielded the union from monetary liability for 
collecting fair-share fees in good faith reliance on then-
prevailing Supreme Court precedent.  W.A. 16.  The Wenzig 
Plaintiffs timely appealed, and their case was consolidated for 
argument and opinion with the Diamond Plaintiffs’ case.  
W.A.1. 
II 
The District Courts had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.  We have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District Courts’ judgments 
granting the Defendants’ motions to dismiss de novo.  See, e.g., 
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Foglia v. Renal Ventures Mgmt., LLC, 754 F.3d 153, 154 n.1 
(3d Cir. 2014). 
III 
We are not the first court of appeals to rule on this 
question, and we join a growing consensus of our sister circuits 
who, in virtually identical cases, have held that because the 
unions collected the fair-share fees in good faith reliance on a 
governing state statute and Supreme Court precedent, they are 
entitled to a good faith defense that bars Appellants’ claims for 
monetary liability under § 1983.  See Janus v. AFSCME, 
Council 31, 942 F.3d 352 (7th Cir. 2019) (“Janus II”); Mooney 
v. Ill. Educ. Ass’n, 942 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 2019); Danielson v. 
Inslee, 945 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2019); Lee v. Oh. Educ. Ass’n, 
951 F.3d 386 (6th Cir. 2020); Ogle v. Ohio Civil Serv. Emps. 
Ass’n, AFSCME Local 11, 951 F.3d 794 (6th Cir. 2020); 
Wholean v. CSEA SEIU Local 2001, 955 F.3d 332 (2d Cir. 
2020). 
A. Private parties may assert a good faith defense to 
§ 1983 liability. 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action for plaintiffs 
who are injured by a person who, acting “under color of any 
statute . . . of any State,” causes the plaintiff to suffer “the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by 
the Constitution.”  Appellants assert that the Unions—acting 
under color of a Pennsylvania statute—caused them to be 
deprived of their First Amendment rights when the Unions 
collected fair-share fees from Appellants’ paychecks. 
In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., the Supreme Court held 
that § 1983 allows suits against private parties acting under 
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color of state law.  457 U.S. 922, 941 (1982).  Under Lugar, a 
private party may be liable under § 1983 when the private-
party defendant deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right 
by exercising “a right or privilege having its source in state 
authority” and where the private-party defendant may be 
“appropriately characterized as [a] ‘state actor[].’”  Id. at 939.2  
But while the Lugar Court confirmed that private-party 
defendants may be subject to suit under § 1983, the Court also 
recognized a “concern” that its ruling could unfairly subject 
these private entities to liability even though the private parties 
had “innocently [made] use of seemingly valid state laws.”  Id. 
at 942 n.23. 
Despite voicing this “concern,” the Court in Lugar left 
open the question of whether private parties may avail 
themselves of immunity to suit.  Id.  In Wyatt v. Cole, the 
Supreme Court answered this question, ruling that immunity is 
reserved for governmental entities, not private parties subject 
to suit under § 1983.  504 U.S. 158, 168 (1992).  The Court 
nonetheless noted—without explicitly ruling—that “principles 
of equality and fairness may suggest . . . that private citizens 
who rely unsuspectingly on state laws they did not create and 
may have no reason to believe are invalid should have some 
protection from liability.”  Id.  But the Court left the question 
of whether private-party defendants are entitled to a “defense 
based on good faith” for “another day.”  Id. at 169.  Later, the 
 
2 Under Lugar, a private party may be appropriately 
characterized as a state actor where the private party “is a state 
official, . . . has acted together with or has obtained significant 
aid from state officials, or [where its] conduct is otherwise 
chargeable to the State.”  Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.  Appellants 
do not challenge the Unions’ statuses as state actors. 
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Supreme Court again alluded to, without adopting, this good 
faith defense.  See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 414 
(1997) (“Like the Court in Wyatt, . . . we do not express a view 
on [the good faith defense].”). 
We addressed this open question shortly after Wyatt was 
issued.  In Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, we 
held that a “good faith defense is available” to private parties 
who act under color of state law and are sued for monetary 
liability under § 1983.  20 F.3d 1250, 1277 (3d Cir. 1994).  We 
stated our “basic agreement” that “private defendants should 
not be held liable under § 1983 absent a showing of malice and 
evidence that they either knew or should have known of the 
statute’s constitutional infirmity.”  Id. at 1276 (citations 
omitted).  We noted that good faith gives private defendants “a 
defense that depends on their subjective state of mind, rather 
than the more demanding objective standard of reasonable 
belief that governs qualified immunity.”  Id. at 1277.3 
 
3 In his concurrence, JUDGE FISHER suggests that a historical 
approach to the issue of good faith requires a complex analysis 
based on common law.  He asserts that the various opinions in 
Wyatt imply “that any limitation on private-party liability must 
be grounded in the common-law approach.”  Fisher Op. at I.C.  
JUDGE PHIPPS similarly urges that the good faith defense 
should be available if and only if a “deeply rooted common-
law tradition exists” to support it.  See Phipps Op. 
    I can find no such implication, let alone any directive to that 
effect.  Indeed, the point—the very narrow ruling—of the 
majority in Wyatt is that qualified immunity is uniquely a 
creature of common law to which private parties are not 
entitled.  And the Wyatt concurrence’s statement (which Judge 
Fisher quotes as the basis for this implication), that “[w]e may 
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not transform what existed at common law based on our 
notions of policy or efficiency,” 504 U.S. at 171-72, did no 
more than provide support for the majority’s reasoning 
rejecting an expansion of the concept of qualified immunity, 
and speaks not at all to the issue of the good faith defense or its 
contours. 
    JUDGE FISHER also suggests that my reading of Jordan is 
“expansive[],” Fisher Op. at II.B., and JUDGE PHIPPS “does not 
see a valid basis for recognizing such a defense,” Phipps Op., 
but urges that, instead, our adoption of the good faith defense 
in Jordan was a “misnomer,” id. 
    I disagree.  In Jordan, we embraced the good faith defense 
and opined on the contours of its relatively modest 
requirements.  20 F.3d at 1275-77.  We concluded that good 
faith gives private actors a defense that depends on their 
“subjective state of mind,” id. at 1277, and looked to whether 
the private party acted with “malice” or “either knew or should 
have known of the statute’s constitutional infirmity,” id. at 
1276.  And I note that, importantly, in Jordan, we made no 
mention of the common-law approach.  Jordan is controlling 
precedent as to the legal standard that we apply in this case.   
    And let us be clear: we are not talking about an across-the-
board good faith defense to a § 1983 action that is inconsistent 
with the common law.  Instead, we are talking about 
prohibiting monetary liability when a private-party defendant 
acted in good faith reliance on a statute enacted in accordance 
with binding Supreme Court precedent in a situation that has 
no exact analogue at common law.  Doesn’t the analogy to 
abuse of process in note 4 below—or, in its own way, JUDGE 
FISHER’s intensive historical analysis—make that very point?  
See also, e.g., Janus II, 942 F.3d at 365 (noting that no common 
law tort “is a perfect fit”). 
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B. Appellants’ § 1983 claims are barred by the Unions’ 
good faith defense. 
Jordan therefore established that the good faith defense 
is available to a private-party defendant in a § 1983 case if, 
after considering the defendant’s “subjective state of mind,” id. 
at 1277, the court finds no “malice” and no “evidence that [the 
defendant] either knew or should have known of the statute’s 
constitutional infirmity,” id. at 1276.   
There was no such finding of malice or knowledge in Jordan, 
and, similarly here, Appellants have not asserted that either of 
these disqualifying factors is implicated.  Indeed, as noted 
above, the Unions’ collection of fair-share fees was authorized 
by over four decades of Supreme Court precedent and a 
Pennsylvania statute, 71 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 575 
(West 2020), that explicitly authorized fair-share fees for 
public-sector unions like the Unions.  Accordingly, in this case, 
Appellants cannot possibly make any “showing of malice” or 
demonstrate that the Unions “either knew or should have 
known of [§ 575]’s constitutional infirmity.”  Jordan, 20 F.3d 
at 1276 (citation omitted).  The Unions are therefore entitled to 
the good faith defense under Jordan. 
 
    This is not the huge jurisprudential leap that my colleagues 
urge.  This is a reasonable way to afford private parties some 
of the protection that government actors are afforded when 
they act in a situation in which the existing state and federal 
law explicitly condoned their behavior.  Do we need to chart a 
complex path to ensure that this underlying principle is 
recognized?  We did not in Jordan, and we do not need to do 
so here. 
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Moreover, “principles of equality and fairness,” Wyatt, 
504 U.S. at 168, independently weigh in favor of the Unions 
being protected from suit.  It is fair—and crucial to the 
principle of rule of law more generally—that private parties 
like the Unions should be able to rely on statutory and judicial 
authorization of their actions without hesitation or fear of 
future monetary liability.  Janus II, 942 F.3d at 366 (“The Rule 
of Law requires that parties abide by, and be able to rely on, 
what the law is . . . .”); Danielson, 945 F.3d at 1105 (finding 
that the defendant unions did “exactly what we expect of 
private parties: adhering to the governing law of its state and 
deferring to the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the 
Constitution”); Wholean, 955 F.3d at 336 (noting that unions 
“cannot reasonably be deemed to have forecasted whether, 
when, and how Abood might be overruled” and holding that 
they “were entitled to rely on directly controlling Supreme 
Court precedent”). 
Appellants present numerous arguments that the good 
faith defense should not bar their claims against the Unions.  
First, Appellants urge us to rule that the good faith defense only 
applies to § 1983 suits that allege theories of liability for which 
the most analogous common law tort requires malice or 
probable cause.  We decline to do so for several reasons.  First, 
Wyatt applied this most analogous tort concept in considering 
the way courts have analyzed immunity from suit under 
§ 1983.  The Wyatt Court did not mention this concept in 
relation to the good faith defense and there is no reason to think 
that it would apply a historical immunity analysis to what it 
obviously considered to be a distinct good faith analysis.  See 
Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 168.  Other courts have concurred in this 
view.  See Danielson, 945 F.3d at 1101 (observing that Wyatt’s 
discussion of the most closely analogous common law tort 
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“applies only to . . . qualified immunity” and not to the good 
faith defense); Janus II, 942 F.3d at 365 (“[T]he Supreme 
Court in Wyatt [] embarked on the search for the most 
analogous tort only for immunity purposes—the Court never 
said that the same methodology should be used for the good-
faith defense.”); Lee, 951 F.3d at 392.  In any event, because 
the legal basis for § 1983 immunity is distinct from the legal 
basis for the good faith defense, we see no independent reason 
to adopt the most analogous common law tort inquiry here.  See 
Danielson, 945 F.3d at 1101 (“The rationales behind 
[immunity and the good faith defense], and their limitations, 
are not interchangeable.”).  Instead, as noted above, our 
decision is based on the “principles of equality and fairness” 
identified in Wyatt.  504 U.S. at 168.4 
 
4 We note that the Appellants did not urge (or even suggest) 
that we delve into the historical “common-law approach” with 
the level of historical detail and specificity that JUDGE 
FISHER’s concurrence would require, so we need not consider 
it.  Our sister circuits have construed what JUDGE FISHER refers 
to broadly as the “common-law approach” as a narrower most 
analogous common law tort approach, and, although they 
ultimately reject the idea that this approach should be 
incorporated into our analysis, they have uniformly determined 
that, even if we were to adopt this mode of analysis, abuse of 
process is the most analogous common law tort on these facts.  
See Janus II, 942 F.3d at 365; Danielson, 945 F.3d at 1102; 
Lee, 951 F.3d at 392 n.2; cf. Ogle, 951 F.3d at 797.  Abuse of 
process, which provides a “cause[] of action against private 
defendants for unjustified harm arising out of the misuse of 
governmental processes,” Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 164, corresponds 
to the Unions’ use of a Pennsylvania statute to collect fair-share 
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Next, Appellants cite numerous cases in which 
defendants who have taken money or property in violation of a 
plaintiff’s constitutional rights have been required to disgorge 
or return the money or property.  First, most of these cases 
involved government defendants, not private parties.  But in 
addition, one of the main considerations in Abood was the 
benefit conferred on plaintiffs by the union activities.  This has 
no role in the various cases cited by Appellants.  But it does 
play a role when we are considering fairness because 
Appellants benefitted from the fair-share fees they paid.  Thus, 
we are not disputing that a cause of action for return of money 
or property exists for Appellants.  We are merely saying that 
principles of fairness make this situation different. 
Third, Appellants urge that the good faith defense does 
not apply to claims for restitution, which they allegedly seek.  
But contrary to their urging, Appellants’ claims do not 
constitute claims for restitution.  “[R]estitution in equity 
typically involved enforcement of a constructive trust or an 
equitable lien, where money or property identified as 
belonging in good conscience to the plaintiff could clearly be 
traced to particular funds or property in the defendant’s 
possession.”  Montanile v. Bd. of Trustees of Nat’l Elevator 
Indus. Health Benefit Plan, 136 S. Ct. 651, 657 (2016) 
 
fees through government employer payroll withholding.  
Abuse of process also requires a showing of malice and 
probable cause, which would support the availability of the 
good faith defense here.  Id.; see also Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1275-
77.  So, although JUDGE FISHER’s opinion goes well beyond an 
analogy to abuse of process in its “common-law approach,” see 
Fisher Op. at II.B.-III.B., I would not go so far, even if I were 
to look to the common law for guidance on this issue. 
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(quotation marks and citation omitted).  In contrast, where a 
plaintiff pursues a “personal claim against the defendant’s 
general assets,” then that plaintiff is seeking “a legal remedy, 
not an equitable one.”  Id. at 658.  Appellants have not 
demonstrated that their lawsuit seeks recovery from anything 
more specific than the Unions’ general assets, and therefore 
they fail to persuade us that they are suing for restitution.  See 
also Mooney, 942 F.3d at 371 (finding that the plaintiff’s claim 
was “[i]n substance . . . one for damages”); Danielson, 945 
F.3d at 1102-03; Lee, 951 F.3d at 391. 
Appellants next theorize that the Unions can only avoid 
liability—even if there is a good faith defense—if they acted 
appropriately to benefit Appellants as Abood reasoned.  Thus, 
they urge that the District Courts should not have dismissed 
their claims without allowing discovery as to whether the 
Unions’ conduct was consistent with what Abood required.  
But because Appellants have pled an entitlement to return of 
their money based on Janus I, not on the Unions’ conduct, this 
argument falls flat.  See Danielson, 945 F.3d at 1105 (noting 
that because plaintiffs’ “claims arise from the [u]nion’s 
reliance on Abood, not allegations that the [u]nion flouted that 
authority, the [u]nion need not show compliance with Abood’s 
strictures to assert successfully a good faith defense”); Lee, 951 
F.3d at 392 (“[I]f Defendants improperly spent the fair-share 
fees, Plaintiff would have an independent Abood claim but it 
would not render the exaction of the fee an act in bad faith.” 
(citation omitted)). 
Finally, Appellants argue that an “entity”—as opposed 
to an “individual”—cannot invoke the good faith defense.  But 
this argument is plainly contradicted by our ruling in Jordan, 
which made the good faith defense available to a law firm.  
Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1277; see also Danielson, 945 F.3d at 1100 
 23 
(rejecting argument that only individuals may invoke the good 
faith defense).  Appellants’ argument that the good faith 
defense is incompatible with the text of § 1983 falls flat for the 
same reason: Jordan involved a § 1983 cause of action.  
Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1277. 
IV 
As Judge Wood noted in Janus II, the good faith defense 
to section 1983 liability is “narrow” and “only rarely will a 
party successfully claim to have relied substantially and in 
good faith on both a state statute and unambiguous Supreme 
Court precedent validating that statute.”  942 F.3d at 367.  In 
this unique circumstance, the good faith defense applies here 
to protect the Unions from monetary liability under § 1983.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Courts’ judgments. 
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Diamond v. Pa. State Educ. Ass’n, No. 19-2812 
Wenzig v. Serv. Emps. Int’l, No. 19-3906 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment. 
In April 1871, Congress passed, and President Grant 
signed, an extraordinary act, variously called the Ku Klux Klan 
Act, Third Force Act, or Civil Rights Act of 1871. On its face, 
the first section of that act—what we now know as 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983—provided its violators no immunities from or defenses 
to liability. See Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, 
13. Of course, the Supreme Court has since read immunities 
and defenses into § 1983, but it has done so principally on the 
conceit that they were available at common law in 1871, and 
implicitly incorporated into the statute. While this approach 
certainly limits the scope of liability, it also constrains judges 
from straying too far from the statutory text. In only one 
context has the Court invented a freestanding defense: the 
qualified immunity of certain state officials. Whatever might 
be said for that doctrine—and it is increasingly under 
scrutiny—I believe that the precedent of neither the Supreme 
Court nor our own Court warrants another divergence from the 
common-law approach in the present context. And however 
strongly considerations of equality and fairness might 
recommend such action, it is beyond our remit to invent 
defenses to § 1983 liability based on our views of sound policy. 
I must, therefore, respectfully disagree with the reasoning of 
JUDGE RENDELL’s opinion announcing the Court’s judgment. 
Nevertheless, I concur in the affirmance of the District 
Courts’ orders. There was available in 1871, in both law and 
equity, a well-established defense to liability substantially 
similar to the liability the unions face here. Courts consistently 
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held that judicial decisions invalidating a statute or overruling 
a prior decision did not generate retroactive civil liability with 
regard to financial transactions or agreements conducted, 
without duress or fraud, in reliance on the invalidated statute 
or overruled decision. Because this defense comports with the 
history and purposes of § 1983, I conclude that it is available 
to the unions here and supports the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ 
complaints. 
I 
A 
Section 1983 “cannot be understood in a historical 
vacuum.” City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 
258 (1981). Despite the statute’s “general language,” Tenney v. 
Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951), creating a form of 
liability in law and equity that seemingly “admits no 
immunities,” Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920 (1984), the 
Supreme Court has consistently construed § 1983 “in the light 
of common-law principles that were well settled at the time of 
its enactment,” Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 123 (1997). 
Those principles “provide the appropriate starting point” for 
“defining the elements of damages [under § 1983] and the 
prerequisites for their recovery,” Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 
247, 257-58 (1978), including any available immunities and 
defenses, see Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 529 (1984).  
The paradigm application of this common-law approach 
has been the absolute immunity of legislators, judges, and 
certain other state officials. Congress, the Supreme Court has 
said, gave “no clear indication” in passing § 1983 that it “meant 
to abolish wholesale all common-law immunities.” Pierson v. 
Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967); see also Bauers v. Heisel, 361 
F.2d 581, 587-88 (3d Cir. 1966) (en banc). As a result, when an 
official asserts absolute immunity, the Court has demanded “a 
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considered inquiry into the immunity historically accorded the 
relevant official at common law and the interests behind it.” 
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 421 (1976). This inquiry 
involves “consult[ing] the common law to identify those 
governmental functions that were historically viewed as so 
important and vulnerable to interference by means of litigation 
that some form of absolute immunity from civil liability was 
needed.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 363 (2012); see also 
Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 484-86 (1991); Imbler, 424 U.S. 
at 422-24; Pierson, 386 U.S. at 553-54; Tenney, 341 U.S. at 
376. While the scope of immunity at common law in 1871 does 
not exclusively define its scope under § 1983—the statute is 
not “simply a federalized amalgamation of pre-existing 
common-law claims,” Rehberg, 566 U.S. at 366—the inquiry 
nevertheless remains grounded in historical analogy. Judges 
“do not have a license to create immunities based solely on 
[their] view of sound policy.” Id. at 363. 
Even when absolute immunity does not apply, the Court 
has still employed the common law approach. To “defin[e] the 
contours and prerequisites of a § 1983 claim,” Manuel v. City 
of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911, 920 (2017), it has read the statute 
“against the background of tort liability that makes a man 
responsible for the natural consequences of his actions.” 
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961); see also Memphis 
Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305-06 (1986). In 
particular, the Court has looked to “[t]he common-law cause of 
action . . . [that] provides the closest analogy to claims of the 
type considered” pursuant to § 1983. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 
U.S. 477, 484 (1994); see also Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 
1715, 1726 (2019). Yet here too, the elements and limitations 
of a § 1983 claim will not necessarily be co-extensive with the 
most analogous common-law cause of action. “Common-law 
principles are meant to guide rather than to control the 
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definition of § 1983 claims,” and so “[i]n applying, selecting 
among, or adjusting common-law approaches, courts must 
closely attend to the values and purposes of the constitutional 
right at issue.” Manuel, 137 S. Ct. at 921. 
B 
The singular exception to this practice is the doctrine of 
qualified immunity. Early on, the Court did refer to the 
common law. In Pierson, which concerned common-law and § 
1983 claims against police officers, the Court held that because 
“the defense of good faith and probable cause” was “[p]art of 
the background of tort liability[] in the case of police officers 
making an arrest,” it was available to the officers in the § 1983 
action as well as the common-law action. 386 U.S. at 556-57 
(citing Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187). Soon, however, as it 
confronted cases involving other executive officials, the Court 
generalized this defense without regard to its common-law 
moorings. “[T]he relevant question” became “whether [the 
official] ‘knew or reasonably should have known that the 
action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would 
violate the constitutional rights of [the plaintiff], or if he took 
the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation 
of constitutional rights or other injury to [the plaintiff].’” 
O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 577 (1975) (quoting 
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975)); see also 
Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 561-62 (1978); Scheuer 
v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974). 
This drift culminated in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 
800 (1982), where “the Court completely reformulated 
qualified immunity along principles not at all embodied in the 
common law,” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 
  5 
(1987).1 The Court abandoned any reference to a subjective 
good-faith standard, noting that such “[i]nquiries . . . can be 
peculiarly disruptive of effective government.” Harlow, 457 
U.S. at 817. Instead, the question was now purely one of 
objective reasonableness, and it would apply “across the 
board,” id. at 821 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citation omitted), 
to all “government officials performing discretionary 
functions,” id. at 818 (majority opinion). 
Yet even as it departed from the common-law model, 
the Court indicated its unwillingness to extend Harlow’s 
policy-based rationale to other contexts. “We reemphasize,” it 
said in 1986, “that our role is to interpret the intent of Congress 
in enacting § 1983, not to make a freewheeling policy choice, 
and that we are guided in interpreting Congress’ intent by the 
common-law tradition.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 
(1986); see also Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 389 (2012) 
(“Nothing about the reasons we have given for recognizing 
immunity under § 1983 counsels against carrying forward the 
common law rule.”). Outside of qualified immunity, the 
“general approach” remained the same: a court first determines 
“whether an official claiming immunity under § 1983 can point 
to a common-law counterpart to the privilege he asserts”; if a 
sufficiently analogous counterpart exists, the court is then to 
“consider[] whether § 1983’s history or purposes nonetheless 
counsel against recognizing the same immunity in § 1983 
actions.” Malley, 475 U.S. at 339-40 (citation omitted). 
 
1 Although Harlow arose under the cause of action created in 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the Court saw no reason to 
distinguish between that context and § 1983, see Harlow, 457 
U.S. at 818 n.30. 
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C 
This background informs the context we confront in 
these cases—the far less developed area of private-party 
liability under § 1983. Any limitation on such liability should, 
as with official liability, “be dealt with . . . by establishing an 
affirmative defense.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 
922, 942 n.23 (1982); see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 
398 U.S. 144, 174 n.44 (1970) (citing Pierson, 386 U.S. 547). 
The Supreme Court has not, however, definitively stated what 
such a defense might be. Rather, in Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158 
(1992), it refused to apply Harlow-style qualified immunity to 
private parties sued under § 1983 for invoking a state replevin 
statute later declared unconstitutional. And that is where the 
doctrine remains. JUDGE RENDELL’s opinion suggests that in 
rejecting the application of qualified immunity, Wyatt opened 
the door to another freestanding, judge-made defense. In my 
view, however, Wyatt stands for the proposition that the 
common-law approach must guide any limitation on private-
party liability under § 1983. 
The Wyatt defendants were private parties who invoked 
a Mississippi statutory procedure that obliged state officials, 
solely upon the declaration of the applicant, “to issue a writ of 
replevin for the seizure of the property described in [the] 
declaration.” Wyatt v. Cole, 710 F. Supp. 180, 182 (S.D. Miss. 
1989). The plaintiff, whose property had been seized, filed an 
action under § 1983 seeking damages and a declaratory 
judgment on the statute’s constitutionality. The district court 
declared the statute unconstitutional but declined to hold the 
private defendants monetarily liable. Id. at 183. The Fifth 
Circuit affirmed, finding the defendants entitled to qualified 
immunity. Wyatt v. Cole, 928 F.2d 718, 721-22 (5th Cir. 1991) 
(per curiam). 
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In reversing, the Supreme Court distinguished between 
post-Harlow qualified immunity and a good-faith defense. The 
basic approach, the Court said, is the one grounded in the 
common law: whether the “parties seeking immunity were 
shielded from tort liability when Congress enacted the Civil 
Rights Act of 1871”; and, if so, whether “§ 1983’s history or 
purpose counsel against applying [the immunity] in § 
1983 actions.” Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 164. The defendants in fact 
argued along these lines, claiming a defense under Pierson 
because they acted without malice and with probable cause. Id. 
at 165. The Court’s response was telling: “Even if there were 
sufficient common law support to conclude that [the 
defendants] . . . should be entitled to a good faith defense, that 
would still not entitle them to what they sought and obtained 
in the courts below: the qualified immunity from suit accorded 
government officials under Harlow.” Id. As to that issue, the 
Court concluded that the “special policy concerns,” articulated 
in Harlow, that “mandat[e] qualified immunity for public 
officials are not applicable to private parties.” Id. at 167. 
For present purposes, this holding has two relevant 
implications. First, contrary to what some of our sister circuits 
have said, the Court in Wyatt made no suggestion that the 
common-law approach applies only in the context of immunity 
and not in the context of a good-faith defense. See Janus v. Am. 
Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 942 F.3d 352, 
365-66 (7th Cir. 2019) (Janus II); Danielson v. Inslee, 945 F.3d 
1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 2019); Lee v. Ohio Educ. Ass’n, 951 F.3d 
386, 391-92 (6th Cir. 2020). In fact, the implication was 
precisely the opposite: “we do not foreclose the possibility,” 
the Court wrote, “that private defendants . . . could be entitled 
to an affirmative defense based on good faith and/or probable 
cause.” Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 169. That is the same defense 
Pierson recognized, explicitly deriving it by analogy from the 
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common law. It was also the argument that the defendants in 
Wyatt made before the Court, but which was “of no avail” 
because it was neither sought nor ruled upon in the lower 
courts. Id. at 165. And, accordingly, it was the basis of the Fifth 
Circuit’s recognition of a good-faith defense on remand. See 
Wyatt v. Cole, 994 F.2d 1113, 1120 (5th Cir. 1993) (Wyatt II).2 
Second, in declining to extend qualified immunity to 
private-party defendants, the Court did not imply, as today’s 
opinion announcing our judgment holds, see Rendell Op. at 
III.B, that alternative policy grounds might supply an 
affirmative defense. 
Although principles of equality and fairness may 
suggest . . . that private citizens who rely 
unsuspectingly on state laws they did not create 
and may have no reason to believe are invalid 
should have some protection from liability, as do 
their government counterparts, such interests are 
not sufficiently similar to the traditional 
purposes of qualified immunity to justify such an 
expansion. 
Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 168. Rather than open the door to an 
independent defense based on “principles of equality and 
fairness,” this statement asserts that, at least in the context of 
private-party § 1983 defendants, equality and fairness 
 
2 Moreover, the distinction between immunities and defenses 
is potentially misleading because qualified immunity is itself 
“an affirmative defense that must be pleaded by a defendant 
official.” Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815 (citing Gomez v. Toledo, 446 
U.S. 635 (1980)). As I note above, the relevant distinction in 
Wyatt is between Harlow-style qualified immunity and a good-
faith defense based on the common-law approach. 
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considerations are not significant enough in themselves to 
warrant divergence from the common-law model in the manner 
of Harlow. Those concerns “may be well founded,” but courts 
“do not have a license to establish immunities from § 1983 
actions in the interests of what [they] judge to be sound public 
policy.” Tower, 467 U.S. at 922-23. 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Wyatt, joined by 
Justice Scalia, underlines both of these points. “Our immunity 
doctrine,” he wrote, “is rooted in historical analogy, based on 
the existence of common-law rules in 1871, rather than in 
‘freewheeling policy choices.’” Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 170 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (alteration omitted) (quoting Malley, 
475 U.S. at 342). Although Harlow “depart[ed] from history in 
the name of public policy,” Justice Kennedy joined the Court’s 
opinion in resisting “exten[sion] [of] that approach to other 
contexts.” Id. at 171. “[W]e may not transform what existed at 
common law based on our notions of policy or efficiency.” Id. 
at 171-72. The implication is that any limitation on private-
party liability must be grounded in the common-law approach. 
Justice Kennedy then went further than the Court in 
laying out what such an inquiry, at least on the Wyatt facts, 
should look like. All of the Justices, including those in dissent, 
accepted that at common law in 1871 the tort actions “most 
closely analogous” to the Wyatt action were “malicious 
prosecution and abuse of process.” Id. at 164 (majority 
opinion); see id. at 172 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 176 
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Both torts required the plaintiff 
to prove that the defendant acted with malice and without 
probable cause. Id. at 166 n.2 (majority opinion); id. at 172 
(Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 176 n.1 (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting). For Justice Kennedy, proof of “subjective bad faith 
on the part of the defendant”—rather than an objective 
standard—went “far towards proving” both elements. Id. at 
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173 (Kennedy, J., concurring). “[T]here is support in the 
common law,” he observed, “for the proposition that a private 
individual’s reliance on a statute, prior to a judicial 
determination of unconstitutionality, is considered reasonable 
as a matter of law; and therefore under the circumstances of 
this case, lack of probable cause can only be shown through 
proof of subjective bad faith.” Id. at 174 (citing Birdsall v. 
Smith, 122 N.W. 626, 627 (Mich. 1909)). Further, five Justices 
agreed that a “good-faith defense” in this context represented 
both the plaintiff’s burden to prove the elements of the offense 
and, relatedly, the defendant’s opportunity to avoid liability by 
showing good faith. See id. at 175; id. at 176 n.1 (Rehnquist, 
C.J., dissenting). 
II 
Under Wyatt, then, any defense to private-party liability 
under § 1983 must derive from the common-law approach and 
may not rest on freestanding policy grounds. The next question 
is whether the defense suggested there—whether the defendant 
acted with malice and without probable cause—is context 
dependent or applies categorically to all cases involving 
private-party defendants. Only the former view is faithful to 
the common-law approach; the latter, like the Supreme Court’s 
qualified-immunity standard in cases such as Procunier, 
O’Connor, and Wood, generalizes a subjective good-faith 
defense, unmooring it from its common-law origins. JUDGE 
RENDELL’s opinion, in addition to its policy-based holding, 
takes this latter view, relying upon our decision in Jordan v. 
Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250 (3d Cir. 
1994). See Rendell Op. at III.A-B. On my reading, however, 
Jordan did not announce a categorical rule, and so we must 
conduct an independent inquiry based on the common-law 
approach. And on that score, I think that instead of determining 
whether a pre-1871 tort is sufficiently analogous, resolution on 
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an alternative ground, also based in the common-law approach, 
is preferable. 
A 
Lugar and Wyatt both concerned “private defendants 
charged with 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability for invoking state 
replevin, garnishment, and attachment statutes later declared 
unconstitutional.” Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 159. So too did Jordan. 
Pursuant to a cognovit clause in a commercial real estate lease, 
the defendants obtained and executed a confessed judgment 
against the plaintiffs in state court. Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1258. 
Along with their complaint, the defendants invoked a 
Pennsylvania procedure that required the prothonotary of the 
court to issue a writ ordering the court’s sheriff to garnish the 
plaintiffs’ bank account. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & 
Frankel, 787 F. Supp. 471, 473-74 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (Fox 
Rothschild). The law required neither pre-deprivation notice 
nor issuance of a writ of service, and indeed the plaintiffs 
received notice only after the seizure. Id. Unsurprisingly 
aggrieved, the plaintiffs thereafter sought, among other things, 
a declaratory judgment that the Pennsylvania procedure was 
unconstitutional and damages under § 1983. 
The district court held that the post-judgment 
garnishment phase of the procedure violated due process, id. at 
477-78, but it dismissed the § 1983 action, determining that the 
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, id. at 479-80. 
While the case was pending on appeal, however, the Supreme 
Court decided Wyatt. Our question, then, was whether the 
defendants were entitled to a good-faith defense. Jordan, 20 
F.3d at 1276. We held that they were, declaring ourselves “in 
basic agreement” with the Fifth Circuit’s holding on remand in 
Wyatt that “[p]rivate defendants should not be held liable under 
§ 1983 absent a showing of malice and evidence that they 
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either knew or should have known of the statute’s 
constitutional infirmity.” Id. (quoting Wyatt II, 994 F.2d at 
1120). 
In my view, Jordan’s holding is best read as limited to 
the context before it. Immediately after announcing our 
agreement with the Fifth Circuit, we clarified that by “malice” 
we had in mind “a creditor’s subjective appreciation that its act 
deprives the debtor of his constitutional right to due process.” 
Id. To support this standard, we cited Justice Kennedy’s 
reference, in his Wyatt concurrence, to Birdsall v. Smith. Id. at 
1276 n.30. That case concerned a malicious-prosecution action 
brought by a milk vendor who had been charged, solely on the 
basis of a report filed with state officials, under a state statute 
later declared unconstitutional. See 122 N.W. at 626-27. We 
also referred to “Pennsylvania cases that place state law 
limitations on the use of judgment by confession” because we 
thought they may “sometimes be relevant on the good faith 
issue.” Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1277. This all suggests that we had 
in mind the factual circumstances of the immediate case—
circumstances essentially similar to those of Lugar and Wyatt. 
B 
Because Jordan cannot be read as expansively as JUDGE 
RENDELL’s opinion suggests, the proper question is whether 
the abuse-of-process and malicious-prosecution torts, from 
which the Wyatt defense is derived, are sufficiently analogous 
to the present action, such that our recognition of that defense 
in Jordan is applicable here. For their part, our sister circuits 
that have confronted the question have so far uniformly 
concluded that those torts do provide the best analogy. See, 
e.g., Janus II, 942 F.3d at 365; Danielson, 945 F.3d at 1102; 
Lee, 951 F.3d at 392 n.2. I think that view is worth questioning, 
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at least to the extent that it supplies the unions a good-faith 
defense here. 
In both Wyatt and Jordan, the private-party defendants 
invoked a generally available state procedure. Upon the 
defendants’ independent initiative, state officials were 
compelled to seize or garnish property of the plaintiffs. That 
mandate was what rendered the state laws unconstitutional in 
each case. See Fox Rothschild, 787 F. Supp. at 477-78; Cole, 
710 F. Supp. at 183. Here, Pennsylvania law required the public 
employer to deduct the fair-share fee from the nonmembers’ 
paychecks, if the collective-bargaining agreement so provided. 
Yet (and this is the key difference) the agreements triggering 
collection of the fees were not the fruit of the unions’ 
independent initiative—the relevant public employer was a 
party to them and necessarily had to agree to them. See 71 Pa. 
Stat. § 575(b)-(c); see also 43 Pa. Stat. § 1101.901 (the 
collective-bargaining agreement is “between the 
representatives of the public employes and the public 
employer”). And the collection of the fees—the compelled 
subsidization of speech—was the constitutional violation. See 
Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 
138 S. Ct. 2448, 2464, 2478 (2018). 
Thus, the relevant state action in our cases stems not 
merely from the involvement of state officials in 
unconstitutional conduct, see Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941, but also, 
to some extent, from the command or express authorization of 
the state to engage in that conduct, see Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 
U.S. 991, 1004 (1982). From this perspective, the torts of abuse 
of process and malicious prosecution provide at best attenuated 
analogies. It seems apparent that we are not dealing here 
simply with a civil “process . . . willfully made use of for a 
purpose not justified by the law,” Thomas M. Cooley, A 
Treatise on the Law of Torts 189 (1876), let alone “the 
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malicious institution of a civil suit,” id. at 187. Insofar as the 
state establishes a law’s justified purposes, we confront the use 
of a procedure for a purpose that the state in part set.3 
It may be, as the Seventh Circuit observed in Janus II, 
that abuse of process and malicious prosecution are the most 
analogous torts, however imperfect the analogy. See 942 F.3d 
at 365. But it does not necessarily follow that they therefore 
supply the basis of a defense. By that logic, a defense is 
potentially always available, no matter how attenuated the 
connection between the common-law cause of action and the 
injury alleged. We must remember that “[c]ommon-law 
principles are meant to guide rather than to control the 
definition of § 1983 claims.” Manuel, 137 S. Ct. at 921. True 
commitment to the common-law approach may eventually 
require deciding where to draw the line between analogous and 
non-analogous causes of action. But at least in this case, I find 
it unnecessary to do so. 
In what follows, I describe an alternative basis for a 
defense, well established at both common law and equity in 
1871, and providing a closer similarity to the facts that we 
confront. Resolving these cases on this ground would both 
avoid the knotty problems raised by a most-analogous-tort test 
and preserve the notion, accepted by six Justices in Wyatt, that 
Harlow was an exception that should not swallow the 
common-law rule. Indeed, in my view, that latter benefit is 
especially compelling, given the recent cogent critiques of 
 
3 It follows from this argument that the parties’ other proposed 
torts—conversion, defamation, tortious interference with 
contract, and intentional infliction of emotional distress—are 
also insufficiently analogous. Their elements are even further 
afield than those of abuse of process and malicious 
prosecution. 
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qualified immunity as incongruent with the principles of 
statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 
1843, 1871-72 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment); Baxter v. Bracey, 140 S. Ct. 1862, 
1864 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of 
certiorari); William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 
106 Calif. L. Rev. 45 (2018). 
III 
 “An unconstitutional act is not a law; . . . it is, in legal 
contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been 
passed.” Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886). 
Derived from the common law, see Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 
505, 507 (1973), this principle from the late nineteenth century 
was premised on the then-prevalent legal theory that judges 
“find” or “declare” rather than “make” law, see Linkletter v. 
Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622-23 (1965); Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal 
Co., 215 U.S. 349, 370 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting). That 
theory fell out of fashion in the early twentieth century, but the 
Norton principle nevertheless proved remarkably influential. 
See, e.g., Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159 (1908). Most 
notably, it underlies the Supreme Court’s more recent 
retroactivity jurisprudence—and thus the plaintiffs’ theory of 
liability in the present cases. See Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Tax’n, 
509 U.S. 86, 95-97 (1993); James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. 
Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 540 (1991) (opinion of Souter, J.); 
Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 326-29 (1987). 
Yet there was a contemporaneous exception to this 
general view, in which a judicial decision either voiding a 
statute or overruling a prior decision does not generate 
retroactive civil liability with regard to financial transactions 
or agreements conducted, without duress or fraud, in reliance 
on the invalidated statute or overruled decision. See, e.g., 
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Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 146-
47 (1921); Oliver P. Field, The Effect of an Unconstitutional 
Statute 221-28 (1935); Note, The Effect of Overruled and 
Overruling Decisions on Intervening Transactions, 47 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1403 (1934). An assessment of the cases applying this 
exception demonstrates its applicability in the present context. 
The exception appears to have developed as a sort of 
corollary to originally English legal and equitable doctrines. 
One such doctrine is that voluntary payments made upon an 
illegal demand are not recoverable except where the payments 
were made under an immediate and urgent necessity. See, e.g., 
Valpy v. Manley (1845), 135 Eng. Rep. 673, 677; 1 C. B. 594, 
602-03 (Tindal, C.J.) (citing and quoting Fulham v. Down 
(1798), 170 Eng. Rep. 820 n.; 6 Esp. 26 n. (Kenyon, C.J.)); 
Brisbane v. Dacres (1813), 128 Eng. Rep. 641, 645; 5 Taunt. 
143, 152 (Gibbs, J.). Another is that money paid pursuant to a 
contract may not be recovered if the contract was formed under 
a mutual mistake of law. See, e.g., Bilbie v. Lumley (1802) 102 
Eng. Rep. 448, 449-50; 2 East 469, 472. Although nineteenth-
century American courts straightforwardly applied these 
doctrines in the contexts in which they originated, see, e.g., 
Bank of U.S. v. Daniel, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 32, 55-56 (1838); Hunt 
v. Rhodes, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 1, 15 (1828); Sprague v. Birdsall, 2 
Cow. 419, 421 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1823), they also invoked them 
when confronting the effects of the practice of judicial review. 
Two lines of cases—one at law, the other in equity—are 
especially notable. 
A 
At common law, money extracted illegally by taxes or 
fees could be recovered through an action of assumpsit. See, 
e.g., 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of 
England *158-59 (describing as a form of assumpsit an action 
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to recover tax or fee payments to a government or other body 
of which one is a member).4 As noted, in Janus the 
unconstitutional act was the compelled subsidization of speech 
through the payment of the fair-share fees. The plaintiffs here 
seek a repayment of the fees they paid prior to Janus and whose 
extraction only became illegal as a result of that decision. 
Several pre-1871 state cases address a similar situation, where 
repayment of a tax, fee, or other expenditure is sought when 
the law or court decision under which it was made is declared 
unconstitutional or overruled. The courts in these cases 
developed a limitation on such liability, uniformly barring 
repayment where the initial expenditure was made voluntarily 
and without duress.  
The most succinct formulation of this doctrine came in 
an 1846 decision of the Maryland high court: 
It is now established, by an unbroken series of 
adjudications in the English and American 
 
4 Although the Supreme Court has often referred specifically to 
tort law when enunciating the common-law approach to § 1983 
immunities and defenses, it has never suggested that 
application of that approach is limited to tort, rather than 
contract, law where the latter is most applicable. Moreover, the 
assumpsit action was in fact a form of the writ of trespass on 
the case—the fountainhead of modern tort law—that officially 
came to supplant actions in debt due to the institutional rivalry 
of the Courts of Common Pleas and King’s Bench. See David 
Ibbetson, Sixteenth Century Contract Law: Slade’s Case in 
Context, 4 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 295 (1984). Assumpsit treats 
misperformance or nonperformance of an implied agreement 
as a tort-like wrong. See John H. Langbein et al., History of the 
Common Law: The Development of Anglo-American Legal 
Institutions 252 (2009). 
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courts, that where money is voluntarily and fairly 
paid, with a full knowledge of the facts and 
circumstances under which it is demanded, it 
cannot be recovered back in a court of law, upon 
the ground, that the payment was made under a 
misapprehension of the legal rights and 
obligations of the party. 
City of Baltimore v. Lefferman, 4 Gill 425, 431 (Md. 1846). The 
operative legal fiction—consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
later statement in Norton—is that a statute or ordinance 
subsequently declared unconstitutional is void even at the time 
the money is transacted pursuant to it, thus creating the 
“misapprehension.” The burden, however, is on the payor to 
establish more than mere reliance on the law’s presumptive 
validity. As the California Supreme Court put it: “The illegality 
of the demand paid constitutes of itself no ground for relief. 
There must be in addition some compulsion or coercion 
attending its assertion, which controls the conduct of the party 
making the payment.” Brumagim v. Tillinghast, 18 Cal. 265, 
266 (1861). The payment, according to the Ohio Supreme 
Court, “can only be considered involuntary when it is made to 
procure the release of the person or property of the party from 
detention, or when the other party is armed with apparent 
authority to seize upon either, and the payment is made to 
prevent it.” Mays v. City of Cincinnati, 1 Ohio St. 268, 278 
(1853). Simply because the law was assumed valid at the time 
of the payment, and therefore that non-payment might result in 
legal enforcement proceedings, was not enough. See Town 
Council of Cahaba v. Burnett, 34 Ala. 400, 404 (1859); see also 
Town of Ligonier v. Ackerman, 46 Ind. 552, 559 (1874), 
overruled in part on other grounds by Jennings v. Fisher, 2 
N.E. 285, 288 (Ind. 1885). 
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court at midcentury also 
adopted this general doctrine. See Taylor v. Phila. Bd. of 
Health, 31 Pa. 73, 75 (1855); Borough of Allentown v. Saeger, 
20 Pa. 421 (1853). In Saeger, the Court stated in dictum that 
“[i]f [the money] had been paid under protest, that is, with 
notice that [the payor] would claim it back, this would repel the 
implication of an assent, and give rise to the right of 
reclamation.” 20 Pa. at 421. It is unclear, however, if this 
standard required the payor actually to bring the threatened 
legal action. Other courts were more explicit in imposing this 
requirement. See, e.g., Burnett, 34 Ala. at 405 (“[T]he case is 
not altered by the fact, that the party so paying protests that he 
is not answerable, and gives a notice that he shall bring an 
action to recover the money back. He has an opportunity in the 
first instance to contest th[e] claim at law.” (quoting Benson v. 
Monroe, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 125, 131 (1851))).5 
Finally, although the United States Supreme Court did 
not, during this period, have a factually similar case, it did 
approvingly recite this doctrine in analogous situations. For 
example, in an 1877 case involving payments to Confederate 
 
5 The Alabama Supreme Court’s adoption of Benson’s 
language is significant. Benson, also an assumpsit action, more 
nearly approximates abuse of process because the plaintiffs, 
who were ship owners, only paid after their vessel was 
attached. Nevertheless, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court still denied recovery. The plaintiffs had the choice of 
either paying or litigating. Benson, 61 Mass. at 131. Burnett’s 
importation of Benson’s standard suggests the similarity 
between the sort of cases described here and abuse-of-process 
situations (though still litigated in assumpsit). It suggests the 
closeness of this rule to the one Wyatt suggested and our Court 
adopted in Jordan. 
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officials for the right to export cotton, the Court said that to 
“justify an action against [the payees], either for the return of 
the money paid . . . or for damages of any kind,” “the doctrine 
established by the authorities is[] that ‘a payment is not to be 
regarded as compulsory, unless made to emancipate the person 
or property from an actual and existing duress imposed upon it 
by the party to whom the money is paid.’” Radich v. Hutchins, 
95 U.S. 210, 212-13 (1877) (quoting Lefferman, 4 Gill. at 436, 
and citing Brumagim, 18 Cal. at 265; and Mays, 1 Ohio St. at 
268); see also Elliott v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 137, 153-
55 (1836). This voluntariness rule remains the applicable 
standard. See McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages 
& Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 38 n.21 (1990). 
B 
The doctrine was also applied in equitable actions, 
usually involving not the payment of a tax or fee, but rather a 
financial transaction between private parties. Its most well-
known enunciation was by Chancellor Kent in 1815: “A 
subsequent decision of a higher Court, in a different case, 
giving a different exposition of a point of law from the one 
declared and known when a settlement between parties takes 
place, cannot have a retrospective effect, and overturn such 
settlement.” Lyon v. Richmond, 2 Johns. Ch. 51, 60 (N.Y. Ch. 
1815), rev’d on other grounds, Lyon v. Tallmadge, 14 Johns. 
501 (N.Y. 1817). In addition to general policy grounds, the key 
principle was, again, that parties may not be relieved of “acts 
and deeds fairly done on a full knowledge of facts, though 
under a mistake of the law.” Id.; see also Shotwell v. Murray, 1 
Johns. Ch. 512, 515-16 (N.Y. Ch. 1815). Later state equity 
courts adopted or followed this doctrine, see, e.g., Doll v. 
Earle, 59 N.Y. 638, 638 (1874); Hardigree v. Mitchum, 51 Ala. 
151, 155-56 (1874); Harris v. Jex, 55 N.Y. 421, 424 (1874); 
Kenyon v. Welty, 20 Cal. 637, 642 (1862), as did at least one 
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federal court, see In re Dunham, 8 F. Cas. 37, 38-39 (D.N.J. 
1872). 
*** 
When Congress in 1871 enacted the law that became § 
1983, it was well established at both law and equity that court 
decisions that invalidated a statute or overruled a prior 
decision, and thereby affected transactional relationships—
between private parties and government officials or 
representatives, or between private parties alone—established 
in reliance on that statute or decision, did not generate civil 
liability for repayment except where duress or fraud was 
present. Whatever the nature of the state action in the present 
cases—whether the state “act[ed] jointly with” the unions or 
“compel[led] the [unions] to” collect the fees, Manhattan 
Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1928 (2019)—
the factual circumstances underlying this doctrine bear a 
substantial similarity to those we confront here. Therefore, in 
my view the doctrine constitutes “a previously existing, 
independent legal basis” sufficient to limit the unions’ liability 
under § 1983. Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 
759 (1995).6 I know of no authority on “§ 1983’s history or 
purposes” that might “counsel against” recognition of this 
defense, Tower, 467 U.S. at 920, and the consistency of its 
application in law and equity safely permits the conclusion that 
Congress did not wish to “impinge” on it “by covert inclusion 
 
6 The Diamond appellants argue strenuously that this is a case 
of restitution. Even if it is, every case upon which they rely can 
be explained according this doctrine. Moreover, they cite cases 
only from the mid-twentieth century or later. There is no 
suggestion that the principle they claim was established in 
1871. The reverse, in fact, seems to be the case. 
  22 
in the general language” of § 1983, Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376. 
IV 
It may be tempting, in cases like the present, to read 
precedent broadly, or appeal to freestanding principles such as 
the rule of law and basic notions of fairness. But we must 
interpret and apply § 1983 as we would any other statute, 
always prepared for the faithful execution of that duty to result 
in a seemingly extreme outcome. For even when that does not 
occur, there is value in adhering to the well-established 
principles of interpretation. 
Because the plaintiffs in these cases have not pleaded 
any facts, suggesting that their payments were either 
sufficiently involuntary or exacted on a fraudulent basis,7 to 
permit a reasonable person to infer that the unions might be 
liable, I concur in the affirmance of the orders granting the 
unions’ motions to dismiss. 
 
7 JUDGE PHIPPS asserts that, even accepting the standard I adopt 
here, the plaintiffs’ payments were not voluntary. I think it 
apparent that none of the plaintiffs have pleaded anything 
approaching the kind of involuntariness or duress articulated in 
the cases I discuss. 
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Diamond v. Pa. State Educ. Ass’n, No. 19-2812 
Wenzig v. Serv. Emps. Int’l, No. 19-3906 
PHIPPS, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
The central question presented in these consolidated 
cases, which seek recovery of agency fees garnished from the 
wages of non-union members, is whether a good faith 
affirmative defense exists to a First Amendment compelled 
speech claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  I do not see a valid basis 
for recognizing such a defense.  A good faith affirmative 
defense was not firmly rooted in the common law in 1871 when 
§ 1983 was enacted, and nothing else compels recognition of 
such a defense today.  For that reason, I would reverse the 
orders dismissing these cases and remand them for further 
proceedings. 
 
My colleagues see it differently.  Judge Rendell 
recognizes such a defense from precedent and out of 
consideration of “principles of equality and fairness.”  Rendell 
Op. at III.B.  In concurring in the judgment only, Judge Fisher 
does not rely on a good faith defense.  Instead, from an 
examination of pre-1871 common law, he identifies another 
limitation on the § 1983 cause of action: it may not be used to 
collect voluntary payments.  See Fisher Op. at III.A.  I disagree 
with these perspectives and respectfully dissent. 
 
The Supreme Court has articulated standards for 
supplementing the plain text of § 1983, which itself identifies 
no immunities or defenses.  Such supplementation requires a 
tradition “so firmly rooted in the common law and . . . 
supported by such strong policy reasons that ‘Congress would 
have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish the 
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doctrine.’”  Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 637 
(1980) (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967)).  
Even if such a deeply rooted common-law tradition exists, that 
will still not permit supplementation of § 1983 in a manner 
inconsistent with the statute’s history or purpose.  See Wyatt v. 
Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 164 (1992) (“[I]rrespective of the common 
law support, we will not recognize an immunity available at 
common law if § 1983’s history or purpose counsel against 
applying it in § 1983 actions.”).   
 
I. A GOOD FAITH DEFENSE WAS NOT FIRMLY ROOTED IN 
THE COMMON LAW IN 1871 WHEN CONGRESS ENACTED 
§ 1983. 
 
The specific inquiry here focuses on whether a good 
faith defense was firmly rooted in the common law in 1871.  
But as an initial point of reference, the good faith affirmative 
defense is not firmly rooted in the common law today – either 
generally or for any specific cause of action.   
 
In articulating 18 affirmative defenses that must be 
raised in a responsive pleading, Rule 8(c) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure does not include good faith.  See Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 8(c).  The rule’s listing is not exhaustive, and leading 
treatises supplement those 18 listed defenses, but those 
treatises do not identify a common-law good faith affirmative 
defense.  See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller et al., Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 1271 (3d ed., Apr. 2020 Update) (recognizing no 
common-law good faith affirmative defense); 2 Jeffrey A. 
Parness, Moore’s Federal Practice § 8.08 (3d ed. 2020) (listing 
affirmative defenses, such as immunities, but not including 
good faith).  If a good faith affirmative defense were deeply 
rooted in the common law, such as defenses like statute of 
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limitations, laches, or accord and satisfaction, then one would 
expect to find it listed in Rule 8(c) – or at least to make a 
showing in a leading treatise.   
 
Similarly, a review of other statutory causes of action 
reveals that Congress has not understood good faith to be so 
deeply rooted as to go unspoken.  Rather, when Congress 
wants to include good faith as an affirmative defense, it does 
so expressly.1  And that begs the question: if the good faith 
defense were so well established that it could be assumed “that 
Congress [in enacting § 1983] would have specifically so 
provided had it wished to abolish the doctrine,” then why did 
Congress find the need to expressly provide for the defense in 
many other statutes but not in § 1983?  Pierson, 386 U.S. at 
555.   
 
In sum, the absence of a good faith affirmative defense 
from Rule 8(c) along with its presence as a defense in other 
federal statutes suggests that today the good faith affirmative 
defense is not firmly rooted in the common law.  
 
1 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78r (providing a good faith defense to 
securities fraud); 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (providing a good faith 
defense to trademark infringement); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1640, 
1691e(e), 1692k(e), 1693m(d) (providing a good faith defense 
to claims related to consumer credit protection); 16 U.S.C 
§ 1540(a)(3), (c)(3) (providing a good faith defense to certain 
claims under the Endangered Species Act); 29 U.S.C. § 259(a) 
(providing a good faith defense to certain claims under the Fair 
Labors Standards Act); 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(iii) (providing 
a good faith defense to a liquidated damages claim under the 
Family Medical Leave Act). 
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That conclusion, of course, is not dispositive – it could 
be that a good faith affirmative defense was deeply entrenched 
in the common law in 1871 but has lost traction over time.  But 
cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c) (continuing to identify the virtually 
obsolete affirmative defense of injury to fellow servant).  To 
make such a showing would require proof similar to that 
adduced in Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951), 
wherein the Supreme Court determined that legislative 
immunity applied to § 1983 claims.  See id. at 377-78.  In 
reaching that conclusion, the Supreme Court relied on evidence 
of that immunity dating back to sixteenth and seventeenth 
century English law, provisions of the Articles of 
Confederation and the Constitution, as well as protections 
specifically articulated in 41 of the then 48 admitted States.  
See id. at 372-76. 
 
By contrast no such evidence is present here.  No party 
identifies a pre-1871 case recognizing a common-law good 
faith affirmative defense – either as a general matter or in the 
context of any particular cause of action.  Judge Rendell’s 
opinion does not identify any common-law basis for such a 
defense.  Nor do any of the other courts applying a good faith 
defense to agency fee cases identify any grounding in common 
law for such an affirmative defense.2   
 
2 See Wholean v. CSEA SEIU Local 2001, 955 F.3d 332, 334-
36 (2d Cir. 2020); Lee v. Ohio Educ. Ass’n, 951 F.3d 386, 392 
n.2 (6th Cir. 2020); Ogle v. Ohio Civil Serv. Emps. Ass’n, 
AFSCME Local 11, 951 F.3d 794, 797 (6th Cir. 2020) (per 
curiam); Danielson v. Inslee, 945 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 
2019); Janus v. Am. Fed. of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 
31, 942 F.3d 352, 364 (7th Cir. 2019) (finding “no common-
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The strongest case for such a defense comes from Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s dissenting opinion in Wyatt v. Cole.  There, 
he viewed the good faith defense as “something of a 
misnomer” because it actually referred to elements of the 
common-law torts of malicious prosecution and abuse of 
process.  504 U.S. 158, 176 & n.1.  That perspective is telling.  
Chief Justice Rehnquist identified no authority for the 
proposition that good faith functions as a transsubstantive 
affirmative defense – applicable across a broad class of claims, 
such as the defenses of accord and satisfaction, laches, and res 
judicata.  See id. at 175-80.  Nor did his dissenting opinion 
recognize good faith as a claim-specific affirmative defense, 
such as the defenses of assumption of risk, contributory 
negligence, or duress.  See id.  At most, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
determined that the elements of two common-law tort claims 
could be defeated by proof of subjective good faith.  See id. at 
176 & n.1. 
 
Judge Fisher picks up on that theme.  From an 
examination of the common law, he concludes that in 1871 no 
cause of action allowed for later recovery of voluntary 
payments.  See Fisher Op. at III.A.  But unlike the cases he 
relies upon, the agency fee payments at issue here were not 
voluntary – they were wage garnishments that were paid to 
unions.3  More fundamentally, Judge Fisher’s approach is 
 
law history before 1871 of private parties enjoying a good-faith 
defense to constitutional claims”). 
 
3 See 71 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 575(c) (West 1988) 
(requiring employers to garnish wages for fair-share agency 
fees for transmittal to unions); see also Wenzig Compl. ¶¶ 9-
10 (Wenzig App. 42) (alleging that non-union members were 
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analogous to the one that the Supreme Court did not adopt in 
Wyatt – which prompted Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent.  
Section 1983 created a new statutory cause of action, not one 
pre-defined by the common law.  Thus, it is immaterial that no 
pre-1871 cause of action permitted recovery for voluntary 
payments that were subsequently declared unconstitutional: 
the Civil Rights Act of 1871 established a new cause of action 
in part to provide “a remedy where state law was inadequate.”  
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173 (1961), overruled on other 
grounds by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 
(1977).   
  
For these reasons, I do not see the common law as 
limiting the scope of a § 1983 claim for compelled speech – 
either through a good faith affirmative defense or through a 
separate limitation on the statutory cause of action. 
 
II. BOTH THE HISTORY AND THE PURPOSE OF § 1983 
COUNSEL AGAINST RECOGNITION OF A GOOD FAITH 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE. 
 
For completeness, even supposing that the common law 
did recognize good faith as an affirmative defense in 1871, 
more would be required.  Before a deeply rooted affirmative 
 
“forced to pay” fair-share agency fees and that those fees were 
deducted from nonmembers’ wages “without their consent”); 
Diamond Second Am. Compl. ¶ 24 (Diamond App. 74) 
(alleging that the class representatives were “compelled . . . to 
pay a financial penalty for exercising their constitutional right 
to not join a union”), ¶ 39 (Diamond App. 77) (defining the 
putative class as persons who were “compelled to pay money . 
. . as a condition of employment”). 
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defense can apply to a § 1983 action, it must also be “supported 
by such strong policy reasons that Congress would have 
specifically so provided had it wished to abolish the doctrine.”  
Owen, 445 U.S. at 637 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Put 
differently, a common-law defense will not be read into § 1983 
when it is inconsistent with the history or the purpose of 
§ 1983.  See Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 164.  And neither the history 
nor the purpose of § 1983 supports the recognition of good 
faith as an affirmative defense for violations of every 
constitutional right.   
 
A good faith defense is inconsistent with the history of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1871.  As the Supreme Court has 
explained, that statute is predicated on the understanding that 
“Congress has the power to enforce provisions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment against those who carry a badge of 
authority of a State and represent it in some capacity, whether 
they act in accordance with their authority or misuse it.”  
Monroe, 365 U.S. at 171-72 (emphasis added).  As this 
statement makes clear, the history behind the Civil Rights Act, 
which Congress enacted pursuant to the Enabling Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment,4 demonstrates the need to remedy 
actions taken in accordance with state law.  And thus a good 
faith affirmative defense – that a state actor was merely 
following state law – is an especially bad fit as an atextual 
addition to § 1983.   
 
 
4 See Civil Rights Act of 1871, Pub. L. 42-22, 17 Stat. 13, 13 
(Apr. 20, 1871) (entitling the legislation as “[a]n Act to enforce 
the [p]rovisions of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . and for other 
[p]urposes”).   
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Nor can a good faith affirmative defense be reconciled 
with the purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.  The Supreme 
Court has identified “three main aims” for § 1983.  Monroe, 
365 U.S. at 173.  Those were (i) “to override certain kinds of 
state laws”; (ii) to provide “a remedy where state law was 
inadequate”; and (iii) “to provide a federal remedy where the 
state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not available in 
practice.”  Id. at 173-74.  Each of those purposes reflects a 
dissatisfaction with the redress provided by state law for 
constitutional violations.  It would seem, then, that state law 
would be the last place to look for limitations on the redress 
§ 1983 allows – the whole point of the statute was to overcome 
the limitations of state law.  Thus, absent some foundation in 
federal law, incorporating a defense rooted only in state 
common law into § 1983 is inconsistent with the purpose of 
that statute.   
 
The later enactment of § 1988 also supports this 
conclusion.  There, Congress allowed for consideration of state 
common law, but only to supplement “deficienc[ies] in the 
provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish 
offenses against law.”  42 U.S.C. § 1988.  That is quite 
different than looking to state common law to limit the 
remedies permitted by § 1983. 
 
Thus, even if it were firmly entrenched in the common 
law, a good faith affirmative defense should not be grafted onto 
the text of § 1983 – either as a transsubstantive defense (such 
as accord and satisfaction or res judicata) or a cause-of-action 
specific defense (such as assumption of the risk or duress).  
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III. THE ROLE OF GOOD FAITH IN § 1983 LITIGATION DOES 
NOT RISE TO THE LEVEL OF AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE. 
 
Although good faith does not operate as an affirmative 
defense, it still may have a role in § 1983 litigation.  As this 
Circuit recognized, proof of good faith may negate an element 
of a § 1983 claim.  See Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & 
Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1277-78 (3d Cir. 1994).  Specifically, 
the gross negligence mental state element required for a 
procedural due process claim can be rebutted by a showing of 
subjective good faith through adherence to then-existing law.  
See id. at 1278.  That holding was context specific, and it 
recognized good faith as a means to disprove a mental state 
requirement.  See id. at 1277-78.  Consistent with Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s observation, the Jordan decision used the term 
‘good faith defense’ as a misnomer – it was actually applying 
good faith to negate a specific element of a cause of action, as 
opposed to asserting it as an affirmative defense.  See id.; see 
generally Affirmative Defense, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th 
ed. 2019) ( “A defendant’s assertion of facts and arguments 
that, if true, will defeat the plaintiff’s or prosecution’s claim, 
even if all the allegations in the complaint are true.”).  Thus, I 
do not read our precedent as recognizing good faith as an 
across-the-board affirmative defense, or even as cause-of-
action specific affirmative defense.  At most, a showing of 
good faith can negate a mental state element of a claim – such 
as gross negligence required for a procedural due process 
claim.  See Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1277-78.  But that is of no 
moment here because a claim for compelled speech does not 
have a mens rea requirement.  See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, 
Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2464 (2018) 
(“[T]he compelled subsidization of private speech seriously 
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impinges on First Amendment rights[.]”); see also United 
States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 408, 416 (2001); 
Wooley v Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977); W. Va. State Bd. 
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).   
 
Beyond Jordan, Judge Rendell relies on “principles of 
equality and fairness” to justify a good faith defense.  Rendell 
Op. at III.B.  But in full context, the Supreme Court made clear 
that “principles of equality and fairness” were insufficient to 
establish immunity:   
 
Although principles of equality and fairness may 
suggest . . . that private citizens who rely 
unsuspectingly on state laws they did not create 
and may have no reason to believe are invalid 
should have some protection from liability, as do 
their government counterparts, such interests are 
not sufficiently similar to the traditional 
purposes of qualified immunity to justify such an 
expansion. 
 
Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 168.  Nothing about that quotation validates 
“principles of equality and fairness” as standards for evaluating 
potential affirmative defenses.  As explained above, the 
appropriate inquiry looks instead to the common law.   
 
But even still, principles of equality and fairness would 
not carry the day here.  Neither equality nor fairness 
overwhelmingly favors the reliance interests of the unions in 
pre-existing law over the free speech rights of non-members 
who were compelled to support the unions.  The Supreme 
Court in Janus already accounted for those reliance interests in 
overturning Abood.  See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2484-86; see also 
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Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).  Those 
considerations need not be double-counted under the guise of 
a good faith affirmative defense.  And that is to say nothing of 
the text, history, and purpose § 1983, which make it 
particularly ill-suited to a construction that elevates reliance 
interests over the vindication of constitutional rights.   
 
* * * 
 
Good faith was not firmly rooted as an affirmative 
defense in the common law in 1871, and treating it as one is 
inconsistent with the history and the purpose of § 1983.  Nor 
does our precedent or even principles of equality and fairness 
favor recognition of good faith as an affirmative defense to a 
compelled speech claim for wage garnishments.  I respectfully 
dissent and vote to reverse the orders dismissing the complaints 
and to remand these cases.   
